Institutional Darkness: The Inaction of the PCMRU and Odesa SIZO as a Systemic Dysfunction of Penitentiary Oversight (Proceedings in Case No. 420/9112/26)
2 April 2026, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Ukrayinskyy and Others v. Ukraine — 42 applicants, correctional colony No. 26 in Zhovti Vody, violations of Articles 3, 13, and 34 of the Convention. Inhuman treatment, absence of effective remedies, pressure by the administration on prisoners who dared to complain to Strasbourg. Ukraine will pay compensation. As it has paid before. Hundreds of thousands of euros. Out of taxpayers’ pockets.
Someone will ask: why does this keep happening? Why did the Court explicitly find in its judgment that Ukraine had not provided a “clear, comprehensive, and convincing” evidentiary basis regarding conditions of detention — “no reliable data on living space,” no primary evidence on temperature conditions, mould, food quality, or toilet privacy? Why, in case after case, year after year, the same picture: the state loses not because the conditions are actually good and it simply failed to prove it, but because the conditions are genuinely appalling — and the system finds it more convenient to pay compensation than to change?
The answer lies in part in two documents submitted to the Odesa District Administrative Court on 24 April 2026.
WHAT SYSTEMIC OPACITY LOOKS LIKE IN ACTION
On 12 March 2026, I submitted an information request to the State Institution “Odesa Pre-trial Detention Centre” (SIZO) and the South-Central Interregional Department for the Execution of Criminal Sentences (the Department). Nothing extraordinary: statistics for 16 years — occupancy, mortality, suicides, punishment cells, disciplinary sanctions, use of force. The figures without which it is impossible to understand the scale of suffering of people held in the Odesa SIZO, to develop systemic protective measures, or — ultimately — to protect Ukraine itself from further defeats in Strasbourg.
The response came on 25 March: a refusal.
And on 24 April 2026 — the written submissions of the Odesa SIZO and the Department to the court in Odesa. A document I recommend preserving as a specimen of how a bureaucratic system justifies its own opacity.
The respondent states that the requested information “does not exist as a separate document or consolidated record,” that providing it would require “an analysis of primary documents and a calculation of indicators” — and that this would amount to “effectively creating new information.” And therefore — refusal.
Read that again. An institution required to keep a record of every prisoner, every use of force, every death, every placement in a punishment cell — tells the court that it cannot provide this data because it would constitute “new information.”
This is not a technical refusal. This is a legal position of impunity.
I will not be too delicate. What the Odesa SIZO and the Department did is not a lawyer’s mistake. It is a deliberate institutional strategy: if there are no figures, there is no problem. If there are no mortality statistics — there are no deaths. If there is no record of punishment-cell placements — there is no solitary confinement. If there are no overcrowding data — there is no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
This is precisely how — through the absence of documentation — cases reach Strasbourg in which the Ukrainian Government “failed to rebut” the applicants’ allegations. Not because it did not wish to. But because it systematically destroyed or never created the informational foundation that would have allowed it to rebut anything.
The European Court in Ukrayinskyy stated explicitly: Ukraine has systematically failed to provide primary evidence regarding detention conditions. This is a documented institutional habit.
MAGYAR HELSINKI: CITING A JUDGMENT TO JUSTIFY ONE’S OWN VIOLATION
I wish to dwell separately on one legal argument in the submission that struck me by its audacity.
The Odesa SIZO cites the Grand Chamber judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary (2016) — and invokes it as a justification for its own refusal to provide information.
For those unfamiliar: in Magyar Helsinki, the Grand Chamber found Hungary in violation of Article 10 of the Convention, ordering it to pay compensation for refusing access to public information. The state that refused — lost.
The Odesa SIZO cites a judgment against a state that refused information — as an argument in support of its own refusal.
I do not know how else to describe this, other than as a demonstration of complete institutional brazenness. Or, perhaps, a genuinely sincere conviction that the court would not actually read the case materials.
TAXPAYERS AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Every ECtHR judgment against Ukraine in detention conditions cases is taxpayers’ money. Not abstract “state funds.” The money of people who pay VAT at the supermarket, excise duty on petrol, personal income tax. These people fund a system that: holds prisoners in conditions violating Article 3 of the Convention; refuses to record and publish statistics on those violations; and then loses in Strasbourg — again at the expense of those same taxpayers.
The total amount paid by Ukraine in cases concerning detention conditions already exceeds tens of millions of euros. Every new refusal to provide statistics is a contribution to the next defeat.
IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
Torture does not always begin with a blow. Sometimes it begins with an empty cell in a report. With the line “data unavailable.” With the answer: “information is not recorded in the requested format.”
Opacity is not a technical problem. It is the defence mechanism of a system that does not wish to know the truth about itself. Because if the truth is known — it can be demanded. A claim can be filed. Strasbourg can be won. The system can be forced to change.
That is precisely why statistics are also a protection against torture. And precisely why they are so persistently concealed.
Case No. 420/9112/26 will be heard by the Odesa District Administrative Court. I am confident in my position. The respondents’ position is on the record, available for scrutiny.
P.S. I separately provide the quotation from the judgment in Ukrayinskyy and Others v. Ukraine:
69. The observations submitted by the Government – who possess, or ought to possess, the most comprehensive knowledge of the events at issue –are subject to even stricter scrutiny. The Court has previously identified recurring deficiencies in submissions it received in cases concerning conditions of detention in Ukraine, notably where the Government’s arguments were confined to general statements reproducing information prepared by the prison authorities (see Belyaev and Digtyar v. Ukraine, nos. 16984/04 and 9947/05, § 38, 16 February 2012, and Rodzevillov. Ukraine, no. 38771/05, § 53, 14 January 2016), or where they failed altogether to address certain issues raised by the applicants (see Sukachov, cited above, § 90 and Sili v. Ukraine, cited above, § 48, 8 July 2021). This included situations where the Government had not provided reliable information regarding the size of cells and the actual number of inmates (see Suslov and Batikyan v. Ukraine, nos. 56540/14 and 57252/14, § 113,6 October 2022, and Sili, cited above, § 45). Furthermore, the Government consistently overlooked the need to submit primary evidence with a view to rebutting the applicants’ specific complaints regarding inadequate temperature, mouldy cells, lack of light and fresh air, poor quality of food and water, or lack of privacy when using the toilet. Where such information was provided, it frequently pertained to periods either preceding or following an applicant’s detention (see, for example, Sparysh and Kutsman v. Ukraine[Committee], nos. 49709/18 and 49870/18, § 14, 12 September 2024). Lastly, digital evidence such as photographs or video footage of detention premises, where available, has rarely been used effectively. In particular, such material has often lacked captions or other identifying details linking it to a specific cell or applicant, despite the significant role this type of evidence plays in cases concerning conditions of detention (see, for instance, Alimov v. Turkey, no. 14344/13, § 76, 6 September 2016; Sukachov, cited above, § 90; İlerdeand Others v. Türkiye, nos. 35614/19 and 10 others, §§ 48 and 97,5 December 2023; and, for illustrative purposes, Govorov v. Ukraine (dec.)[Committee], no. 20060/21, 2 February 2023).
