Empirical Study of Disciplinary Practices Concerning Lawyers, Prosecutors and Investigators in Ukraine
This article presents Ukraine’s first comparative empirical study of disciplinary practices concerning three key participants in criminal proceedings: lawyers, prosecutors, and National Police investigators. The study draws on primary official statistical data obtained directly from the relevant disciplinary authorities – regional Bar Qualification and Disciplinary Commissions (BQDCs), the Prosecutors’ Qualification and Disciplinary Commission (PQDC), the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the National Police of Ukraine – through public information requests submitted in March–April 2026.
The study’s central hypothesis is that Ukraine’s disciplinary liability system operates in fundamentally different ways with respect to lawyers, prosecutors, and investigators: specifically, that lawyers face a structurally higher risk of being held liable, and that the sanctions imposed on them are significantly harsher than those applied to representatives of the prosecution. The analysis covers a six-year period (2020–2025) and employs three analytical tools: a relative risk indicator (the proportion of those sanctioned relative to the total registered workforce), a structural distribution of sanctions by severity, and a synthetic index of the punitive character of disciplinary practice.
The findings reveal a profound structural asymmetry: at least two-thirds of investigators and prosecutors who appear before disciplinary bodies receive no more than a warning or reprimand, while over two-thirds of lawyers face considerably harsher outcomes – suspension or disbarment. Regional Bar Qualification and Disciplinary Commissions are shown to operate according to markedly different sanctioning models, ranging from structurally punitive (Kyiv, Odesa) to preventive and educational (Ivano-Frankivsk). The Disciplinary Commission of the Prosecutor General’s Office (DCPGO), despite its formal independence, replicates a model of institutional self-protection, with a complaint-to-sanction conversion rate of under 10%. Disciplinary practice within the National Police of Ukraine is characterised by a “soft core”: approximately 90% of sanctions imposed on investigators take the form of reprimands or warnings.
The article demonstrates that the principle of equality of arms in domestic criminal proceedings remains purely declaratory: a lawyer subjected to disciplinary pressure risks their entire professional future, whereas an investigator facing equivalent culpability typically receives nothing more than a formal reprimand. The study also documents a notable transparency deficit – the majority of bar self-governance bodies show a marked reluctance to disclose public information about their own disciplinary practices, in stark contrast to prosecution and police authorities.
On the basis of these findings, the article formulates recommendations for reforming the institution of disciplinary liability for lawyers, including: ensuring genuinely adversarial procedures in disciplinary proceedings; introducing publicly accessible electronic registers; developing uniform methodological standards for sanction selection; and establishing systematic public monitoring of disciplinary practice using standardised indicators.
